The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Ethics and Economics

  • Marc Fleurbaey
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2559

Abstract

In recent decades, an important corpus of theories in normative economics (social choice theory, the theory of fair allocation, and inequality and poverty measurement in particular) has developed in which formal analytical tools of economic theory are mobilized in order to relate basic principles of social ethics to precise criteria for the evaluation of social states of affairs. The efficacy of arguments based on veil-of-ignorance devices has been questioned and the scope of impossibility theorems has been circumscribed, leaving the stage to a variety of constructive proposals in several fields of application (voting, resource allocation, public policy, social indicators).

Keywords

Arrow, K. Axiomatic bargaining Axiomatic theory of indices Bargaining Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function Borda rule Business ethics Capability sets Coalition formation Competitive equilibrium Consequentialism Consumer sovereignty Cooperative games Corporate social responsibility Cost–benefit analysis Cost–surplus sharing Dominance criteria Dworkin, R. Egalitarian equivalence Egalitarianism Equality of capabilities Equality of opportunity Equality of resources Ethics and economics Fair allocation Gini coefficient Harsanyi, J. Hypothetical insurance (Dworkin) Identity Impartial observer (J. Harsanyi) Impartiality Impossibility theorem Income distribution Indexing problem Inequality (measurement) Inequality aversion Interest aggregation Interpersonal comparisons of utility Intertemporal preferences Judgements vs interests Liberal paradoxes Libertarianism Lorenz curve Marginal rate of substitution Maximin principle Multidimensional inequality Nash, J. New Welfare Economics Normative economics Objective advantage Ordinal non-comparable (ONC) preferences Original position (Rawls) Other-regarding preferences Pareto principle Positive economics Potential Pareto improvements Poverty measurement Preferences Rawls, J. Responsibility Rights Risk aversion Samuelson, P. Sen, A. Shapley, L. Social choice Social contract Social justice Social welfare functions Subjective utility Tastes Utility functions Utility possibility sets Value judgements Veil of ignorance (Rawls) Well-being 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Fleurbaey
    • 1
  1. 1.