The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Mergers, Endogenous

  • Volker Nocke
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2543

Abstract

The term ‘endogenous mergers’ reflects the view in economic theory that mergers are equilibrium outcomes. The literature on endogenous mergers explicitly analyses firms’ incentives to merge and makes predictions on the volume and type of mergers that are likely to occur. In this literature, merger formation is modelled as a bidding game or non-cooperative coalition formation game (Kamien and Zang 1990; Gowrisankaran 1999; Nocke 2000; Pesendorfer 2005), or as an anonymous merger market where firms can buy or sell corporate assets (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002; Nocke and Yeaple 2007). The literature on endogenous mergers is conceptually distinct from the literature on exogenous mergers, which considers the positive and normative effects of a merger between a given (‘exogenous’) set of firms.

Keywords

Antitrust Bidding games Coalition formation games Collusion Concentration Cournot model Endogenous mergers Exogenous mergers Horizontal mergers Market power Mergers Monopolization Oligopoly Vertical mergers 

JEL Classifications

L40 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Volker Nocke
    • 1
  1. 1.