Abstract
Global games are a class of incomplete information games where small uncertainty about payoffs implies a significant failure of common knowledge. This allows strategic uncertainty to play a crucial and natural role in pinning down equilibrium play. Introduced in the context of two player, two action games by Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61:989–1018, 1993), global games have inspired tractable modelling frameworks that have been used in a wide variety of applications. This article reviews the key ideas that have played a role in theoretical analysis and creating useful applied tools.
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Morris, S. (2018). Global Games. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2506
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2506
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