The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Assortative Matching

Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2481

Abstract

This article reviews the simple economics of matching by characteristics. The goal is to understand sorting patterns in the marriage market and other matching markets by focusing on the nature of the gain from match and the mechanism of the market force of competition.

Keywords

Assortative matching Becker, G. Beckmann, M. Complements and substitutes Incomplete information Koopmans, T. Marriage markets Matching frictions Matching markets Mixed matching Price discrimination Self-matching Substitutes and complements Transferable utility Wage heterogeneity, sources of 

JEL Classifications

C78 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Li Hao
    • 1
  1. 1.