Abstract
This article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of non-cooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.
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Serrano, R. (2018). Nash Program. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2472
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2472
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
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