The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Nash Program

  • Roberto Serrano
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2472

Abstract

This article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of non-cooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.

Keywords

Cooperative games Core Edgeworth, F. Nash program Nash solution Non-cooperative games Shapley value Subgame perfect equilibrium Walrasian outcome 

JEL Classifications

C7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Serrano
    • 1
  1. 1.