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New Institutional Economics

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Abstract

The new institutional economics (NIE) consists of a set of analytical tools or concepts from a variety of disciplines in the social sciences, business and law. The NIE addresses two overarching issues: what are the determinants of institutions – the formal and informal rules shaping social, economic and political behaviour? And what impact do institutions have on economic performance? It is the impact of institutions via property rights and transaction costs that ultimately affect the ability of individuals and societies (at a macro level) to extract the gains from trade which in turn can lead to enhanced economic well-being.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    L. J. Alston

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  1. L. J. Alston
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Alston, L.J. (2018). New Institutional Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2468

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