The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

New Institutional Economics

  • L. J. Alston
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2468

Abstract

The new institutional economics (NIE) consists of a set of analytical tools or concepts from a variety of disciplines in the social sciences, business and law. The NIE addresses two overarching issues: what are the determinants of institutions – the formal and informal rules shaping social, economic and political behaviour? And what impact do institutions have on economic performance? It is the impact of institutions via property rights and transaction costs that ultimately affect the ability of individuals and societies (at a macro level) to extract the gains from trade which in turn can lead to enhanced economic well-being.

Keywords

Agenda control Collective action Contract enforcement Corruption Creative destruction Credible commitment Firm, theory of the Free-rider problem Institutional path dependence Monitoring costs New Deal New institutional economics Political entrepreneurship Principal and agent Prisoner’s Dilemma Property rights Rational ignorance Rule of law Side payments Social capital Social norms Technology Transaction costs of exchange Transaction costs of production Transformation costs 

JEL Classifications

E12 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. J. Alston
    • 1
  1. 1.