Abstract
This article reviews individual models of learning in games. We show that the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning nests different forms of reinforcement and belief learning, and that belief learning is mathematically equivalent to generalized reinforcement, where even unchosen strategies are reinforced. Many studies consisting of thousands of observations suggest that the EWA model predicts behaviour out-of-sample better than its special cases. We also describe a generalization of EWA learning to investigate anticipation by some players that others are learning. This generalized framework links equilibrium and learning models, and improves predictive performance when players are experienced and sophisticated.
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Ho, T.H. (2018). Individual Learning in Games. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2442
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2442
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