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Law, Economic Analysis of

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Abstract

This article surveys the economic analysis of five primary fields of law: property law; liability for accidents; contract law; litigation; and public enforcement and criminal law. It also briefly considers some criticisms of the economic analysis of law.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5

    A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell

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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky
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  2. Steven Shavell
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Polinsky, A.M., Shavell, S. (2018). Law, Economic Analysis of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2440

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