Abstract
This article surveys the economic analysis of five primary fields of law: property law; liability for accidents; contract law; litigation; and public enforcement and criminal law. It also briefly considers some criticisms of the economic analysis of law.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Bibliography
Ayres, I., and R. Gertner. 1989. Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of default rules. Yale Law Journal 99: 87–130.
Bebchuk, L. 1984. Litigation and settlement under imperfect information. RAND Journal of Economics 15: 404–415.
Bebchuk, L., and O. Ben-Shahar. 2001. Pre-contractual reliance. Journal of Legal Studies 30: 423–457.
Becker, G. 1968. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217.
Becker, G., and G. Stigler. 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1–18.
Bentham, J. 1789. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, in the utilitarians. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973.
Blume, L., D. Rubinfeld, and P. Shapiro. 1984. The taking of land: When should compensation be paid? Quarterly Journal of Economics 99: 71–92.
Bolton, P., and M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brown, J. 1973. Toward an economic theory of liability. Journal of Legal Studies 2: 323–349.
Calabresi, G. 1961. Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts. Yale Law Journal 70: 499–553.
Calabresi, G. 1970. The costs of accidents: A legal and economic analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Calabresi, G., and A. Melamed. 1972. Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral. Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128.
Coase, R. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.
Cooter, R., and T. Ulen. 2003. Law and economics. 4th ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Craswell, R. 1996. Offer, acceptance, and efficient reliance. Stanford Law Review 48: 481–553.
Daughety, A. 2000. Settlement. In Encyclopedia of law and economics, ed. B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest, Vol. 5. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Daughety, A., and J. Reinganum. 2000. Appealing judgments. RAND Journal of Economics 31: 502–525.
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 57: 347–359.
Diamond, P. 1974. Single activity accidents. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 107–164.
Diamond, P., and E. Maskin. 1979. An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, I: Steady states. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 282–316.
Hadfield, G. 1994. Judicial competence and the interpretation of incomplete contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 23: 159–184.
Hart, O. 1987. Incomplete contracts. In The new palgrave: A dictionary of economics, ed. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan.
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1988. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica 56: 755–758.
Hay, B., and K. Spier. 1998. Settlement of litigation. In The new palgrave dictionary of economics and the law, ed. P. Newman, Vol. 3. London: Macmillan.
Innes, R. 1999. Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement. Journal of Public Economics 72: 379–393.
Jolls, C., C. Sunstein, and R. Thaler. 1998. A behavioral approach to law and economics. Stanford Law Review 50: 1471–1550.
Kaplow, L. 1986. An economic analysis of legal transitions. Harvard Law Review 99: 509–617.
Kaplow, L. 1994. The value of accuracy in adjudication: An economic analysis. Journal of Legal Studies 23: 307–401.
Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell. 1994a. Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. Journal of Political Economy 102: 583–606.
Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell. 1994b. Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in redistributing income. Journal of Legal Studies 23: 667–681.
Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell. 2001. Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle. Journal of Political Economy 109: 281–286.
Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell. 2002. Fairness versus welfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Katz, A. 1990. The strategic structure of offer and acceptance: Game theory and the law of contract formation. Michigan Law Review 89: 215–295.
Katz, A. 1996. When should an offer stick? The economics of promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations. Yale Law Journal 105: 1249–1309.
Kronman, A. 1978. Mistake, disclosure, information, and the law of contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 7: 1–34.
Landes, W., and R. Posner. 1975. The private enforcement of law. Journal of Legal Studies 4: 1–46.
Landes, W., and R. Posner. 1987a. The economic structure of tort law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Landes, W., and R. Posner. 1987b. Trademark law: An economic perspective. Journal of Law and Economics 30: 265–309.
Landes, W., and R. Posner. 2003. The economic structure of intellectual property law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Libecap, G. 1986. Property rights in economic history: Implications for research. Explorations in Economic History 23: 227–252.
Miceli, T. 1997. Economics of the law: Torts, contracts, property, litigation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mookherjee, D., and I. Png. 1992. Monitoring vis-à -vis investigation in enforcement of law. American Economic Review 82: 556–565.
Png, I. 1986. Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error. International Review of Law and Economics 6: 101–105.
Polinsky, A.M. 1980. Private versus public enforcement of fines. Journal of Legal Studies 9: 105–127.
Polinsky, A.M. 1983. Risk sharing through breach of contract remedies. Journal of Legal Studies 12: 427–444.
Polinsky, A.M., and S. Shavell. 1979. The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. American Economic Review 69: 880–891.
Polinsky, A.M., and S. Shavell. 2000. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45–76.
Polinsky, A.M., and S. Shavell. 2001. Corruption and optimal law enforcement. Journal of Public Economics 81: 1–24.
Polinsky, A.M., and S. Shavell, ed. 2007. Handbook of law and economics. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Posner, R. 1972. Economic analysis of law. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Posner, R. 1985. An economic theory of the criminal law. Columbia Law Review 85: 1193–1231.
Posner, R. 2003. Economic analysis of law. 6th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers.
Priest, G., and B. Klein. 1984. The selection of disputes for litigation. Journal of Legal Studies 13: 1–55.
Reinganum, J. 1988. Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion. American Economic Review 78: 713–728.
Reinganum, J., and L. Wilde. 1986. Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs. RAND Journal of Economics 17: 557–566.
Rogerson, W. 1984. Efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract. RAND Journal of Economics 15: 39–53.
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, A. 1992. Relational contracts in the courts: An analysis of incomplete agreements and judicial strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21: 271–318.
Schweizer, U. 1989. Litigation and settlement under two-sided incomplete information. Review of Economic Studies 56: 163–178.
Shavell, S. 1980a. Damage measures for breach of contract. Bell Journal of Economics 11: 466–490.
Shavell, S. 1980b. Strict liability versus negligence. Journal of Legal Studies 9: 1–25.
Shavell, S. 1981. A note on efficiency vs distributional equity in legal rulemaking: Should distributional equity matter given optimal income taxation? American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 71: 414–418.
Shavell, S. 1982a. On liability and insurance. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 120–132.
Shavell, S. 1982b. The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system. Journal of Legal Studies 11: 333–339.
Shavell, S. 1985. Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent. Columbia Law Review 85: 1232–1262.
Shavell, S. 1987a. Economic analysis of accident law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shavell, S. 1987b. The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent. American Economic Review 77: 584–592.
Shavell, S. 1987c. A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 77: 107–110.
Shavell, S. 1989. Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigation. RAND Journal of Economics 20: 183–195.
Shavell, S. 1991. Specific versus general enforcement of law. Journal of Political Economy 99: 1088–1108.
Shavell, S. 1993. The optimal structure of law enforcement. Journal of Law and Economics 36: 255–287.
Shavell, S. 1994. Acquisition and disclosure of information prior to sale. RAND Journal of Economics 25: 20–36.
Shavell, S. 1995. The appeals process as a means of error correction. Journal of Legal Studies 24: 379–426.
Shavell, S. 1997. The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system. Journal of Legal Studies 26: 575–612.
Shavell, S. 2004. Foundations of economic analysis of law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shavell, S. 2006. On the writing and interpretation of contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 22: 289–314.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 599–617.
Spier, K. 1992. The dynamics of pretrial negotiation. Review of Economic Studies 59: 93–108.
Spitzer, M., and E. Talley. 2000. Judicial auditing. Journal of Legal Studies 29: 649–683.
Umbeck, J. 1981. A theory of property rights with application to the California gold rush. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Wils, W. 1993. Who should bear the costs of failed negotiations? A functional inquiry into precontractual liability. Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 4: 93–134.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Polinsky, A.M., Shavell, S. (2018). Law, Economic Analysis of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2440
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2440
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences