Large Games (Structural Robustness)
In strategic games with many semi-anonymous players all the equilibria are structurally robust. The equilibria survive under structural alterations of the rules of the game and its information structure, even when the game is embedded in bigger games. Structural robustness implies ex post Nash conditions and a stronger condition of information-proofness. It also implies fast learning, self-purification and strong rational expectations in market games. Structurally robust equilibria may be used to model games with highly unspecified structures, such as games played on the web.
KeywordsHerding Large games Mixed-strategy equilibrium Pure-strategy equilibrium Purification Rational expectations equilibrium Structural robustness
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