The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Political Budget Cycles

  • Allan Drazen
Reference work entry


Theoretical and empirical research on political budget cycles is surveyed and discussed. Significant political budget cycles are seen to be primarily a phenomenon of the first elections after the transition to a democratic electoral system.


Asymmetric information Competence Democracy Electoral cycles Electoral systems Fiscal manipulation Fiscal policy Fiscal transparency Imperfect information Moral hazard Political budget cycles Political expenditure cycles Political revenue cycles Rational voting Separating equilibria Signalling Targeted public spending 

JEL Classifications

E6 H5 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Allan Drazen
    • 1
  1. 1.