The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Market Institutions

  • John McMillan
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2398

Abstract

Market-supporting institutions ensure that property rights are respected, that people can be trusted to live up to their promises, that externalities are held in check, that competition is fostered, and that information flows smoothly. Evidence is reviewed here on some market institutions: property rights and contracting with and without the law, and mechanisms to sustain information flow in markets.

Keywords

Adverse selection Akerlof, G. Asymmetric information Coase, R. Contracting Equity market Fisheries Grameen Bank Group lending India Information Information transmission Land titles Market institutions Markets for lemons Micro-credit Moral hazard Non-price information North, D. Property rights Screening Signalling Trade credit Transaction costs 

JEL Classifications

O1 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John McMillan
    • 1
  1. 1.