Abstract
Policymakers face political constraints that make enacting reform difficult. Since the late 1980s economists have developed a framework to analyse the deeper political underpinnings of policy inefficiency. This article develops a framework for delineating the key findings of this literature. It then briefly sketches out the role of institutions in facilitating policy reform.
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Mukand, S.W. (2018). Policy Reform, Political Economy of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2383
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2383
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Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
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