Abstract
The liabilities of sovereign states are not directly enforceable, for example by court-imposed transfer of collateral. Sovereign borrowing must be sustained by the prospect that indirect sanctions follow default. The credibility of sanctions for default and the roles of third parties and reputations for motivating repayment are discussed. The interaction of sovereignty and externalities between creditors complicates the renegotiation of sovereign debt. The importance of the collective action problem for debt restructuring is reviewed.
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Kletzer, K.M. (2018). Sovereign Debt. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2377
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2377
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