Abstract
Modelling what each agent believes about her opponents, what she believes her opponents believe about her, and so on, plays a prominent role in game theory and its applications. This article describes Harsanyi’s formalism of type spaces, which provides a simple, elegant representation of probabilistic belief hierarchies. A special emphasis is placed on the construction of rich type spaces, which can generate all ‘reasonable’ belief hierarchies in a given game. Recent developments, employing richer representation of beliefs, are also considered.
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Siniscalchi, M. (2018). Epistemic Game Theory: Beliefs and Types. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2375
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2375
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