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Theory Appraisal

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Abstract

Economists and other scientists appraise theories in terms of criteria such as evidential support, predictive accuracy, usefulness, and reliability in research and practice. This entry addresses three general problems concerning theory appraisal. 1. What is it for evidence to be confirmationally relevant to a theory? 2. How can evidential support be measured? 3. On what other criteria should theory appraisal in economics depend? The third question raises special problems, since economic models so often incorporate statements that appear to be false. But answers to general questions concerning confirmation matter to the conduct of economics, too.

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Eells, E., Hausman, D.M. (2018). Theory Appraisal. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2311

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