The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Theory Appraisal

  • Ellery Eells
  • Daniel M. Hausman
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2311

Abstract

Economists and other scientists appraise theories in terms of criteria such as evidential support, predictive accuracy, usefulness, and reliability in research and practice. This entry addresses three general problems concerning theory appraisal. 1. What is it for evidence to be confirmationally relevant to a theory? 2. How can evidential support be measured? 3. On what other criteria should theory appraisal in economics depend? The third question raises special problems, since economic models so often incorporate statements that appear to be false. But answers to general questions concerning confirmation matter to the conduct of economics, too.

Keywords

Bayes, T. Bayesian confirmation theory Ceteris paribus Confirmation Duhem–Quine problem Experimental economics Friedman, M. Habit Hempel, C. Hume, D. Hypothetico-deductive method Induction Likelihood McCloskey, D. Mill, J. S. Popper, K. Prior probability Probability Rhetoric of economics Subjective probability Testing Theory appraisal 

JEL Classifications

B4 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ellery Eells
    • 1
  • Daniel M. Hausman
    • 1
  1. 1.