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Justice (New Perspectives)

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Abstract

This article provides a survey of recent normative work on justice. It shows how the concern for distributive equality has been questioned by the idea of personal responsibility and the idea that there is nothing intrinsically valuable in levelling down individual benefits. It also discusses the possibility of combining a concern for the worse off with a concern for Pareto efficiency, within both aggregative and nonaggregative frameworks, which includes a discussion of the arguments of prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, and welfarism. Finally, the article briefly reviews the modern literatures on rights-based reasoning, intergenerational justice and international justice.

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    Bertil Tungodden

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Tungodden, B. (2018). Justice (New Perspectives). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2301

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