Abstract
This article reviews the concepts of individual rationality and collective rationality as they appear in the economics literature. In particular, the existing literature on social choice and aggregate demand points to a fundamental disconnect between these two notions of rationality. A possible reconciliation of this disconnect is suggested.
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Hong, L. (2018). Collective Rationality. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2265
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2265
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