The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Liability for Accidents

  • Steven Shavell
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2248

Abstract

Legal liability for accidents determines the circumstances under which injurers must compensate victims for harm. The effects of liability on incentives to reduce risk, on risk-bearing and insurance (both direct coverage for victims and liability coverage for injurers), and on administrative expenses are considered. Liability is also compared with other methods of controlling harmful activities, notably, with regulation and corrective taxation.

Keywords

Accident insurance Contributory negligence Corrective taxes Damages Due care Judgment-proof problem Liability for accidents Liability insurance Moral hazard Negligence rule Product liability Risk aversion Safety regulation Strict liability 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven Shavell
    • 1
  1. 1.