The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Property Law, Economics and

  • Dean Lueck
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2225

Abstract

This entry shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. It examines both the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It also examines various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property, and state property. Property law is understood as a system of societal rules designed to create incentives for people to maintain and invest in assets, which in turn leads to specialization and trade.

Keywords

Akerlof, G.: and land markets Asymmetric information And adverse selection And servitudes Average product rule Coase Theorem Common interest communities Common property Compensation And investment decisions Contracting: costs Epstein, R.: and alienability of rights Externalities Common law responses Neighbourhood First possession Land use: servitudes Liability rules: vs. property rules Negligence: vs strict liability Open access property Paradox of compensation Posner, R.: and eminent domain Private property Property law: externalities Property rights Regimes Origins Alieneability Property rules: vs liability rules Public trust Rule of capture Servitudes And asymmetric information Social norms: and property rights State property Strict liability: vs negligence Takings: and US Constitution Regulatory Transaction costs And Coase Theorem Trespass: vs nuisance Zoning 

JEL Classifications

D23 D62 K11 K23 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dean Lueck
    • 1
  1. 1.