Abstract
Many countries have implemented reforms designed to grant their monetary authorities greater independence from direct political influence. These reforms were justified by research showing central bank independence was negatively correlated with average inflation among developed economies. An important line of research developed measures of central bank independence and studied their relationship with inflation and real economic activity. Different theoretical approaches have been used to model central bank independence. Critics of the reform movements towards central bank independence have expressed concerns that independence can weaken the accountability of central banks.
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Walsh, C.E. (2018). Central Bank Independence. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2217
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2217
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