The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Cooperative Equilibrium

  • A. Mas-Colell
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_221

Abstract

The term ‘cooperative equilibria’ has been imported into economics from game theory. It refers to the equilibria of economic situations modelled by means of cooperative games and solved by appealing to an appropriate cooperative solution concept. The influence is not entirely one way, however. Many game theoretic notions (e.g. Cournot–Nash equilibrium, the Core) are formalizations of pre-existing ideas in economics.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. Mas-Colell
    • 1
  1. 1.