The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd


  • Kevin Roberts
Reference work entry


Although collusive practices are not restricted to the economic relationships of a well-defined sub-group in society, it is common to use the term collusion in the context of cooperative activity between different firms. With regard to the study of collusion, research has centred on the conditions most conducive to collusion and, in both theoretical and empirical work on the operation of collusive arrangements (see Scherer 1980, Chaps. 6 and 7).

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin Roberts
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