Abstract
We survey some recent empirical work concerning the analysis of auctions. We begin by describing a two-step nonparametric approach for estimating bidding models that is commonly used in the applied literature. Two applications of this approach are considered: empirical work on bidding in Treasury markets, and empirical tests for collusion in auctions.
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Bajari, P. (2018). Auctions (Applications). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2166
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2166
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