The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Family Economics

  • John Ermisch
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2149

Abstract

Family economics is the application of the analytical methods of microeconomics to family behaviour. It aims to improve our understanding of resource allocation and the distribution of welfare within the family, investment in children and inter-generational transfers, family formation and dissolution and how families and markets interact. In family economics, non-market interactions are crucial for family behaviour and individual welfare.

Keywords

Altruism Becker, G Child nutrition and mortality Collective models of the household Demographic transition Family decision-making Family economics Family planning Fertility in developed countries Fertility in developing countries Human capital Intergenerational income mobility Intergenerational transfers Intrahousehold welfare Labour supply Malthus, T Marriage and divorce Rotten Kid Theorem Shadow pricing Women’s work and wages 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Ermisch
    • 1
  1. 1.