Abstract
Coordination problems arise when a game has multiple Nash equilibria and all players have a common interest in avoiding a non-equilibrium state. To achieve an equilibrium state, agents must come to understand one another’s intentions. Communication can facilitate this understanding under some, but not all, circumstances. In the absence of communication among agents, coordination may also sometimes be achieved with the aid of extrinsic signals that have come to be associated with the actions of others. In some settings, past actions themselves serve as precedents, without the benefit of any communication.
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Ochs, J. (2018). Coordination Problems and Communication. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2142
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2142
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