Abstract
Work at the intersection of computer science and game theory is briefly surveyed, with a focus on the work in computer science. In particular, the following topics are considered: various roles of computational complexity in game theory, including modelling bounded rationality, its role in mechanism design, and the problem of computing Nash equilibria; the price of anarchy, that is, the cost of using decentralizing solution to a problem; and interactions between distributed computing and game theory.
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Acknowledgment
The work for this article was supported in part by NSF under grants CTC-0208535 and ITR-0325453, by ONR under grant N00014-02-1-0455, by the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by the ONR under grants N00014-01-1-0795 and N00014-04-1-0725, and by AFOSR under grant F49620-02-1-0101. Thanks to Larry Blume, Christos Papadimitriou, Ilya Segal, Éva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz for useful comments.
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Halpern, J.Y. (2018). Computer Science and Game Theory. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2133
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