Abstract
Graphical games and related models provide network or graph-theoretic means of succinctly representing strategic interaction among a large population of players. Such models can often have significant algorithmic benefits, as in the NashProp algorithm for computing equilibria. In addition, several studies have established relationships between the topological structure of the underlying network and properties of various outcomes. These include a close relationship between the correlated equilibria of a graphical game and Markov network models for their representation, results establishing when evolutionary stable strategies are preserved in a network setting, and a precise combinatorial characterization of wealth variation in a simple bipartite exchange economy.
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Kearns, M. (2018). Graphical Games. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2123
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2123
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