The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Experimental Economics

  • Vernon L. Smith
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2122

Abstract

Experimental methods have features in common across all the sciences. All tend to use the framework of falsification, but there is inherent ambiguity in knowing which of the many hypotheses necessary to construct a test are negated by observations contrary to predictions. This ambiguity tends to engender much discussion, contestability and the design of new experiments that attempt to resolve the open qsts. This social process is not part of the logic of scientific testing, but it explains what scientists do and how new results become established.

Keywords

Bounded rationality Brownian motion Constructivist rationality Dictator games Double auction Duhem–Quine problem Ecological rationality Equilibrium Excess demand Experimental economics Experimental knowledge Extensive form games Falsificationism First-price auctions Friedman, M. Hayek, F. A. Internet, economics of Market power Mechanism design Neuroscience Perfect competition Perfect information Positive economics Prediction Private information Repeated games Risk neutrality Strategic games Subjective probability Subjective utility Testing Ultimatum games 

JEL Classifications

C9 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vernon L. Smith
    • 1
  1. 1.