Abstract
This article is limited to interaction between candidates and voters and examines the cases of two-candidate competition and multiple candidate competition. It employs the spatial model of elections introduced to study single-issue politics and generalized to study multiple-issue politics in order to explain the alternatives strategically offered to voters by candidates or parties competing for electoral office.
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Austen-Smith, D. (2018). Political Competition. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2114
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2114
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