The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Political Competition

  • David Austen-Smith
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2114

Abstract

This article is limited to interaction between candidates and voters and examines the cases of two-candidate competition and multiple candidate competition. It employs the spatial model of elections introduced to study single-issue politics and generalized to study multiple-issue politics in order to explain the alternatives strategically offered to voters by candidates or parties competing for electoral office.

Keywords

Black, D. Downs, A. Duverger’s Law Electoral competition First Welfare Theorem Hotelling, H. Median voter theorem Mixed strategy equilibrium Myopia Nash equilibrium Political competition Rational choice models Voting 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Austen-Smith
    • 1
  1. 1.