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Mechanism Design Experiments

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

Mechanism design experiments bridge the gap between a theoretical mechanism and an actual economic process. In the domain of public goods, matching and combinatorial auctions and laboratory experiments identify features of mechanisms that lead to good performance when implemented among boundedly rational agents. These features include dynamic stability and security in public goods mechanisms, transparency in matching mechanisms, package bidding, simultaneity and iteration in combinatorial auctions.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Yan Chen & John O. Ledyard

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  1. Yan Chen
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  2. John O. Ledyard
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Chen, Y., Ledyard, J.O. (2018). Mechanism Design Experiments. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2071

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