The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Mechanism Design Experiments

  • Yan Chen
  • John O. Ledyard
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2071

Abstract

Mechanism design experiments bridge the gap between a theoretical mechanism and an actual economic process. In the domain of public goods, matching and combinatorial auctions and laboratory experiments identify features of mechanisms that lead to good performance when implemented among boundedly rational agents. These features include dynamic stability and security in public goods mechanisms, transparency in matching mechanisms, package bidding, simultaneity and iteration in combinatorial auctions.

Keywords

Bounded rationality Combinatorial auction Compensation mechanism Convergence Cooperation Dynamic stability English auction Externalities Matching Mechanism design Mechanism design experiments Misrevelation Public goods Public goods production functions Sealed bid auction Social identity theory Social loafing Subgame perfection Supermodularity Value complementarities 

JEL Classifications

C9 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yan Chen
    • 1
  • John O. Ledyard
    • 1
  1. 1.