Skip to main content

Tragedy of the Commons

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
  • 452 Accesses

Abstract

‘The tragedy of the commons’ arises when it is difficult and costly to exclude potential users from common-pool resources that yield finite flows of benefits, as a result of which those resources will be exhausted by rational, utility-maximizing individuals rather than conserved for the benefit of all. Pessimism about the possibility of users voluntarily cooperating to prevent overuse has led to widespread central control of common-pool resources. But such control has itself frequently resulted in resource overuse. In practice, especially where they can communicate, users often develop rules that limit resource use and conserve resources.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 6,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 8,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Ascher, W. 1995. Communities and sustainable forestry in developing countries. San Francisco: ICS Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burger, J., E. Ostrom, R. Norgaard, D. Policansky, and B. Goldstein. 2001. Protecting the Commons: A framework for resource management in the Americas. Washington, DC: Island Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casari, M., and C. Plott. 2003. Decentralized management of common property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51: 217–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, C. 1976. Mathematical bioeconomics: The optimal management of renewable resources. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. Stern. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302: 1907–1912.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finlayson, A., and B.J. McCay. 1998. Crossing the threshold of ecosystem resilience: The commercial extinction of northern cod. In Linking social and ecological systems: Management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience, ed. F. Berkes and C. Folke. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guillet, D. 1992. Covering ground: Communal water management and the state in the peruvian highlands. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hackett, S. 1998. Environmental and natural resources economics: Theory, policy, and the sustainable society. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Janssen, M., eds. 2003. Complexity and ecosystem management: The theory and practice of multi-agent systems. Northampton: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCay, B., and J. Acheson. 1987. The question of the commons: The culture and ecology of communal resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrow, C., and R. Hull. 1996. Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: The case of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative. World Development 24: 1641–1657.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • National Research Council. 1986. Proceedings of the conference on common property resource management. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Research Council. 2002. The drama of the commons, Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, ed. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. Stern, S. Stonich and E. Weber. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. 1965. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker. 1994. Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Weinstein, M. 2000. Pieces of the puzzle: Solutions for community-based fisheries management from native Canadians, Japanese cooperatives, and common property researchers. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 12: 375–412.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Ostrom, E. (2018). Tragedy of the Commons. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2047

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics