Social Security is a pay-as-you-go US federal government programme that provides pensions for retirees and their surviving family members. It is a public annuity that insures against longevity and stock market risks. The payroll tax that finances it discourages private saving and work effort. The projected aging of the US population will strain the programme and necessitate either a reduction in benefits, an increase in payroll taxes, partial privatization, or some combination of these policy reforms, by 2030.
Adverse selection Commitment Crowding out Dependency ratio Longevity insurance Medicaid (USA) Medicare (USA) Overlapping generations models Payroll tax Pensions Retirement Social Security in the United States
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