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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 12499–12512Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Social Choice (New Developments)

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Abstract

Since the late 1970s there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark

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  1. Walter Bossert
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  2. John A. Weymark
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Bossert, W., Weymark, J.A. (2018). Social Choice (New Developments). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2007

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