The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Experimental Labour Economics

  • Armin Falk
  • Simon Gächter
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2005

Abstract

Experimental labour economics uses experimental techniques to improve our understanding of labour economics issues. We start by putting experimental data into perspective with the data-sets typically used by empirical labour economists. We then discuss several examples of how experiments can inform labour economics.

Keywords

Double auction Efficiency wages Employment relation Experimental labour economics Gift exchange Implicit incentives Incomplete contracts Involuntary unemployment Laboratory experiments Labour economics Labour market institutions Minimum wages Moral hazard Opportunistic behaviour Performance incentives Piece rates Repeated games Reservation wage Tournaments Wage rigidity 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Armin Falk
    • 1
  • Simon Gächter
    • 1
  1. 1.