The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Cartels

  • Margaret C. Levenstein
  • Valerie Y. Suslow
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1985

Abstract

Cartels are associations of firms that restrict output or set prices. They may divide markets geographically, allocate customers, rig bids at auctions, or restrict non-price terms. They have often been formed with the participation or support of state actors. In contrast to the pre-Second World War period, today most cartels are illegal in most jurisdictions. The average duration of cartels is between five and 7 years, but the distribution of duration is skewed: a large number of cartels break down within a year but a sizable proportion last for over a decade.

Keywords

Antitrust enforcement Barriers to entry Cartels Cheating Collusion Communication Concentration Coordination Entry Innovation Price fixing Price wars Productivity growth Trust 

JEL Classifications

L13 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Margaret C. Levenstein
    • 1
  • Valerie Y. Suslow
  1. 1.