Abstract
Resale markets are necessary to correct misallocations of assets, but do they always ensure that goods end up in the hands of those who value them most? This article reviews theoretical arguments as to why this need not necessarily be so and when inefficiencies might be expected despite the presence of resale markets. Policy implications are also suggested.
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Jehiel, P. (2018). Resale Markets. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1980
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1980
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