Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 7719–7724Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Learning and Evolution in Games: An Overview

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:

  • 11 Accesses

Abstract

We provide a taxonomy and brief overview of the theory of learning and evolution in games.

The author thanks John Nachbar for a number of helpful conversations and for sharing his expertise on coordinated Bayesian learning. Financial support under NSF Grants SES-0092145 and SES-0617753 is gratefully acknowledged.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   6,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   8,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Benaïm, M., and J.W. Weibull. 2003. Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games. Econometrica 71: 873–903.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K., L. Samuelson, and R. Vaughan. 1995. Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution. Games and Economic Behavior 11: 1–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Björnerstedt, J., and J.W. Weibull. 1996. Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation. In The rational foundations of economic behavior, ed. K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blume, L.E. 2003. How noise matters. Games and Economic Behavior 44: 251–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Börgers, T., and R. Sarin. 1997. Learning through reinforcement and the replicator dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory 77: 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, G.W. 1951. Iterative solutions of games by fictitious play. In Activity analysis of production and allocation, ed. T.C. Koopmans. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, G.W., and J. von Neumann. 1950. Solutions of games by differential equations. In Contributions to the theory of games I, Annals of mathematics studies, vol. 24, ed. H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellison, G. 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61: 1047–1071.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellison, G. 2000. Basins of attraction, long run equilibria, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Review of Economic Studies 67: 17–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Erev, I., and A.E. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foster, D.P., and R. Vohra. 1997. Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 21: 40–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foster, D.P., and R. Vohra. 1998. Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika 85: 379–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foster, D.P., and H.P. Young. 1990. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology 38: 219–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foster, D.P., and H.P. Young. 2003. Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 45: 73–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., and D.M. Kreps. 1993. Learning mixed equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 5: 320–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., and D.K. Levine. 1998. Theory of learning in games. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S. 2002. Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction. Games and Economic Behavior 41: 227–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S., and A. Mas-Colell. 2000. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Econometrica 68: 1127–1150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S., and A. Mas-Colell. 2003. Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium. American Economic Review 93: 1830–1836.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofbauer, J. 2000. From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: Equilibria, dynamics, and ESS. Selection 1: 81–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofbauer, J., and W.H. Sandholm. 2002. On the global convergence of stochastic fictitious play. Econometrica 70: 2265–2294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofbauer, J., and W.H. Sandholm. 2006. Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics. Working paper. University of Vienna and University of Wisconsin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofbauer, J., and K. Sigmund. 1988. Theory of evolution and dynamical systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofbauer, J., and J.M. Swinkels. 1996. A universal Shapley example. Working paper. University of Vienna and Northwestern University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jordan, J.S. 1995. Bayesian learning in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior 9: 8–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E., and E. Lehrer. 1993. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61: 1019–1045.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kandori, M., G.J. Mailath, and R. Rob. 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61: 29–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kandori, M., and R. Rob. 1995. Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications. Journal of Economic Theory 65: 383–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith, J., and G.R. Price. 1973. The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246: 15–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nachbar, J.H. 2005. Beliefs in repeated games. Econometrica 73: 459–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nöldeke, G., and L. Samuelson. 1993. An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction. Games and Economic Behavior 5: 425–454.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nyarko, Y. 1998. Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors. Economic Theory 11: 643–655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, J. 1951. An iterative method of solving a game. Annals of Mathematics 54: 296–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandholm, W.H. 2006. Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium. Working paper. University of Wisconsin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandholm, W.H. 2007. Population games and evolutionary dynamics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlag, K.H. 1998. Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits. Journal of Economic Theory 78: 130–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shapley, L.S. 1964. Some topics in two person games. In Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, vol. 52, ed. M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, M.J. 1984. The stability of a dynamic model of traffic assignment: An application of a method of Lyapunov. Transportation Science 18: 245–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, P.D., and L. Jonker. 1978. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P. 1993. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61: 57–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P. 2004. Strategic learning and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5

    William H. Sandholm

Authors
  1. William H. Sandholm
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Sandholm, W.H. (2018). Learning and Evolution in Games: An Overview. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1948

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation