The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Coalitions

  • Myrna Wooders
  • Frank H. PageJr.
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1933

Abstract

Coalitions appear in an incredible diversity of economic and game-theoretic situations, ranging from marriages, social coalitions and clubs to unions of nations. We discuss some of the major approaches to coalition theory, including models treating why and how coalitions form, equilibrium (or solution) concepts for predicting outcomes of models allowing coalition formation, and current trends in research on coalitions. We omit a number of related topics covered elsewhere in this dictionary, such as matching and bargaining.

Keywords

f-core Abstract games Admissible set Asymmetric information Bargaining Bargaining set Basins of attraction Clubs Coalitions Cooperative games Cores Differential information Domination Epsilon core Extensive form games Far-sighted stability Hedonic games Implicit coalitions Incomplete information Information sharing Inner core Irreversibilities Kernel Law of demand Law of supply Linear programming Link formation Local public goods Myerson value Nash equilibrium Nash program Network formation Non-cooperative games Non-transferable utility games Owen equilibrium Owen set Pairwise stability Partnered core Private information Public goods Shapley value Small group effectiveness Solution concepts Strong stability Subgame perfection Superadditivity Supernetworks Tau value Tiebout hypothesis Transferable utility games von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set 

JEL Classifications

D71 C7 
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Notes

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Myrna Wooders
    • 1
  • Frank H. PageJr.
  1. 1.