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Voting Paradoxes

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

After using an example to motivate why voting theory is so central to the social sciences, this survey describes some of the more recent (and, surprisingly, benign) interpretations of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem as well as explanations of the wide selection of voting paradoxes that drive this academic area. As described, it now is possible to explain all positional voting paradoxes while creating any number of illustrating examples.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-349-95121-5

    Donald G. Saari

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  1. Donald G. Saari
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Saari, D.G. (2018). Voting Paradoxes. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1920

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