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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 10600–10609Cite as

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Predatory Pricing

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Abstract

Predatory pricing is a response to a rival that sacrifices part of the profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances were the rival to remain viable, in order to lessen competition and gain consequent monopoly profit. The presence of intertemporal cost and/or demand linkages as well as network effects complicates the formulation of pricing rules that would distinguish legitimate from exclusionary pricing behaviour, and suggests that standard (non-strategic) models of markets do not necessarily offer much help in gauging the rationality of predation.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Janusz A. Ordover

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  1. Janusz A. Ordover
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Ordover, J.A. (2018). Predatory Pricing. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1778

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