The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd


  • Roy Radner
Reference work entry


A team consists of a number of decision-makers, with common interests and beliefs, but controlling different decision variables and basing their decisions on (possibly) different information. The economic theory of teams is concerned with (1) the allocation of decision variables and information among the team members, and (2) the characterization of efficient decision rules, given the allocation of tasks and information. The theory of teams thus addresses a middle ground between the theory of individual decision under uncertainty and the theory of games, and provides a natural framework for the analysis of mechanisms for decentralization, including market-like mechanisms.


Decisions under uncertainty Demand price Efficient allocation Game-playing Games Information costs Informational decentralization Optimal decision functions Probability Signalling Socialism Teams 

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Roy Radner
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