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Vertical Integration

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

Modern economics takes a two-way approach to vertical integration. The theory of the firm approach focuses on how the unified control of successive production and distribution processes changes investment incentives, while the industrial organization approach studies how vertical integration affects the exercise of market power.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Michael H. Riordan

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  1. Michael H. Riordan
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Riordan, M.H. (2018). Vertical Integration. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1698

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