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Public Goods

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Abstract

This article provides a mathematical and diagrammatic exposition of the theory of public goods as originally formulated by Paul Samuelson. It describes the extension of the model to take account of the costs of distortionary taxation, and discusses the concept of the marginal cost of public funds. Different types of public goods (such as mixed goods and local and global public goods) are discussed before a survey of the incentive problems related to preference revelation.

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Sandmo, A. (2018). Public Goods. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1696

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