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Voting

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Abstract

Virtually all economic doctrines prescribe that certain activities – for example, the provision of public goods – be undertaken by government. Accordingly, such doctrines implicitly prescribe that certain allocative decisions – for example, determining the level of supply of public goods – be made by political rather than market processes. Thus voting (and government decision making generally), though logically a part of political science, is of clear relevance to economic theory.

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Miller, N.R. (2018). Voting. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1672

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